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WHY THE U.S. SUPREME COURT SHOULD REAFFIRM THE 
“FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET” PRESUMPTION IN SECURITIES 
FRAUD CASES 
Jonathan Massey∗ 
On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court heard argument in one of the most 
important securities law cases in decades: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John 
Fund, No. 13-317. The defendant company in the case, Halliburton, is asking 
the Court to overturn its landmark 1988 decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
which adopted a rule known as the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, 
enabling securities fraud class action lawsuits to be brought. 1 
The “fraud-on-the-market” rule is a rebuttable presumption that securities 
prices in an open and developed market like the New York Stock Exchange 
reflect material public information and that investors rely on the integrity of 
the market price.2 Under this presumption, investors who bought or sold stock 
during the relevant time period are able to bring their fraud claims without 
proving that they personally knew of and relied on a misrepresentation in 
making their decision to buy or sell.3 It’s assumed that the information (or 
omission) is “baked into” the market price.4 
Halliburton contends that the Court should overrule Basic and eliminate the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption.5 Here’s why it is wrong: 
• There has always been bipartisan support for the presumption. In 1988, 
the SEC (under the Reagan Administration) urged the Supreme Court to adopt 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption and warned that, without it, private 
securities actions would face insuperable hurdles.6 In 1995, when Republicans 
held a majority in both houses, Congress considered proposals to abolish the 
                                                          
 ∗ Jonathan Massey is a partner in the firm of Massey & Gail LLP, where he specializes in appellate and 
complex litigation. He filed an amicus brief on behalf of a group of civil procedure scholars supporting the plaintiff 
in the 2014 Halliburton case. 
 1 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sep. 9, 
2013). 
 2 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 246 (1988). 
 3 See id. at 245–50.  
 4 Id. at 246. 
 5 Petition for Writ, supra note 1. 
 6 Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 163 
(2009). 
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fraud-on-the-market presumption and warned that, without it, private securities 
actions would face insuperable hurdles.7 In 1995, when Republicans held a 
majority in both houses, Congress considered and rejected proposals to abolish 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 8 Today, the SEC continues to support 
the fraud-on-the-market presumption and filed a brief in Halliburton strongly 
expressing that view.9 Congress and the SEC are better able than the Court to 
evaluate the defendants’ policy objections to the presumption. 
• Numerous other groups and scholars filed briefs in Halliburton 
defending the presumption.10 AARP filed a brief stressing the dangers to 
consumers and investors if the presumption were eliminated.11 Fourteen 
academic economists, including Eugene Fama of the University of Chicago 
(who shared in last year’s Nobel Prize), submitted a brief supporting the 
presumption.12 More than two-dozen other scholars did so as well.13 Charles 
Fried, the former solicitor general who represented the SEC in 1988, filed a 
brief twenty-six years later urging the Court to adhere to its prior decision in 
Basic as a matter of stare decisis.14 Former SEC Chairmen William H. 
Donaldson and Arthur Levitt, Jr. agreed,15 as did twenty-one states and the 
territory of Guam.16 
• Stare decisis principles are particularly forceful in non-constitutional 
cases, where Congress is free to alter the Court’s decisions if it wishes.17 Here, 
there is no basis for departing from Basic.18 Halliburton’s legal arguments are 
largely recycled from the dissenting opinion in Basic by Justices White and 
O’Connor.19 The Court rejected those arguments in 1988, and they are no more 
persuasive now.20 
                                                          
 7 Id.  
 8  Brief in Opposition at 32, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13-317 (U.S. Sep. 9, 2013). 
 9 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., SCOTUS BLOG (2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/halliburton-co-v-erica-p-john-fund-inc/. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Brief of Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae With Respect to Stare Decisis in Support of Respondent at 4–8, 
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/halliburton-co-v-erica-p-john-fund-inc/. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
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• Meanwhile, Basic has become a firmly settled, indispensable part of 
securities law. Without the fraud-on-the-market presumption, securities class 
actions would face enormous hurdles, because each individual stockholder 
would have to show that he or she knew of and relied on the misrepresentation, 
and the case could not be tried in class form. Millions of investors would be 
left without a remedy, because the costs of trying individual claims would 
exceed the potential damages. 
• Even separate suits by large institutional investors rely on the fraud-on-
the-market presumption, so overturning Basic would threaten individual suits 
by investors as well as class actions. 
• Institutional investors increasingly use passive investment strategies 
(such as index investing) that rely on the integrity of the market (within the 
meaning of Basic) and the presumption that relevant public information is 
incorporated into price.21 These investment strategies are built on the bedrock 
premise that prices reflect available public information. If the Supreme Court 
were suddenly to hold that this assumption is false, it would call into question 
the central pillar of many investing strategies.22 Institutional investors 
representing millions of pension beneficiaries and over $1.36 trillion of assets 
under management warned the Supreme Court in the Halliburton case that 
overturning Basic would force the re-evaluation of many settled investment 
practices and the adoption of new and unpredictable guidelines.23 At the very 
least, institutional investors would face a host of additional burdens and 
expenses, because they would be forced to collect and review the disclosures 
of thousands of companies if they sought to retain any possibility of asserting a 
fraud claim by showing the kind of individualized “eyeball” reliance that 
Halliburton argues is required. Institutional investors have warned that this 
might lead them to narrow their portfolios and increase risk.24 
• Without the important check provided by Basic and private securities 
actions, the integrity of U.S. capital markets will be diminished, and investor 
confidence in the fundamental fairness of the financial system will decline. 
                                                          
 21 Lisa Gilbert & Jonathan Massey, What’s Right With Securities Class Action Lawsuits: A Response to the 
U.S. Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform, 2014 PUB. CITIZEN, U.S. CHAMBER WATCH REPORT 1, 4. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
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Studies show that private actions play a key role in deterring securities fraud.25 
For example, one recent study by Stephen Choi, professor of law at NYU, and 
A.C. Pritchard, professor of law at the University of Michigan, found that 
private class actions are more effective than SEC investigations at deterring 
securities fraud and lead to a higher incidence of top officer resignations.26 
Another study by Jonathan M. Karpoff of the University of Washington, D. 
Scott Lee of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and Gerald S. Martin of 
American University examined data from 1978 through 2004 and confirmed 
the importance of private actions.27 
• Private actions are also far more effective at returning compensation to 
victims than government suits.28 For example, in actions against Enron and 
aiders and abettors in the Enron fraud, the SEC recovered $440 million while 
investors recovered about $7.3 billion from private suits. 29 The SEC settlement 
fund in connection with WorldCom was $750 million—at the time the largest 
in the agency’s history compared to $6.1 billion recovered in the private 
action.30 Notably, the private settlement with WorldCom included $24.25 
million from individual directors, while the SEC fine was paid only by the 
company.31 
• Regulation of financial markets in the U.S. actually enhances its 
competitive position against other markets. Recent studies have found that 
foreign companies listing their stocks on their home exchanges and in the 
United States are able to raise capital on better terms, at a lower net cost than 
companies that list only outside the United States.32 Economists refer to this as 
                                                          
 25 Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities Class Actions: An Empirical 
Comparison, 1 (N.Y. Univ. School of Law, Working Paper No. 12-38, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2109739. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Jonathan M Karpoff et al., The Legal Penalties for Financial Misrepresentation, 3 (Working Paper, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=933333. 
 28  Compare Securities and Exchange Commission, Enron, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
(May,14,2007) http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/claims/enron.htm, with Kristen Hays, Enron Settlement: $7.2 
Billion to Shareholders, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Sep. 9, 2008), http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Enron-
settlement-7-2-billion-to-shareholders-1643123.php. 
 29 Id.  
 30 Compare AccountingWeb, $750 Million MCI/WorldCom Settlement is Largest in SEC History, 
ACCOUNTINGWEB (Jul. 7, 2003) http://www.accountingweb.com/topic/750-million-mciworldcom-settlement-
largest-sec-history, with Settlements, WORLDCOM SECURITIES LITIGATION (visited Jan. 5, 2014), 
http://www.worldcomlitigation.com/html/citisettlement.html. The website http://www.worldcomlitigation.com is the 
information site administered by Lead Counsel. 
 31 Id.  
 32 Craig Doidge et al., Has New York Become Less Competitive in Global Markets? Evaluating Foreign 
Listing Choices Over Time 5, 29 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2007-03-012, 2007), available at 
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a cross-listing premium.33 By contrast, companies that cross-list in their home 
exchanges and London, which is widely recognized to have less rigorous 
regulations than the United States, do not enjoy the cross-listing premium. 34 
This premium exists in the United States because of the superior protections 
that the regulatory regime in the United States provides investors. 35 
• After the financial crisis of 2008, many small investors fled U.S. stock 
markets out of concern that the system was stacked against them. Many such 
investors are only now beginning to return. The Supreme Court should not 
create a major roadblock to private securities fraud actions, given the important 
enforcement role it plays in assuring investor confidence. 
• The SEC simply does not have the resources to police the markets 
without the essential supplement of private securities litigation. The drastic 
expansion of the SEC’s responsibilities under Dodd-Frank and other laws, 
coupled with the astonishing growth of trading technologies and strategies, 
means that the SEC cannot be the sole entity responsible for the enforcement 
of the nation’s securities laws. The SEC’s responsibilities have come at the 
cost of enforcement of securities laws, particularly in a time of budgetary 
sequester and government shutdown. In the words of one federal judge, “the 
SEC has been hard hit by budget limitations,” which have forced the agency to 
husband its resources and instead “to focus on the smaller, easily resolved 
cases that will beef up their statistics when they go to Congress begging for 
money.”36 
• The evidence also demonstrates that the criticisms of private securities 
actions are exaggerated. For example, the so-called “in terrorem” effect of 
securities class actions is not supported by the data: 77 percent of securities 
class actions are resolved before a motion for class certification is even filed. 37 
NERA Economic Consulting “did not find reliable statistical relationships 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=982193; Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz, International Differences in the Cost of Equity 
Capital: Do Legal Institutions and Securities Regulations Matter?, 44 J. OF ACCOUNTING RES. 485, 485 (2006).  
 33 Id. at 30. 
 34 Id. at 31. 
 35 Id. at 29. 
 36 Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, THE NEW 
YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/financial-crisis-
why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 
 37 Renzo Comolli et al., Recent Trends in Securities Class Action Litigation: 2012 Full-Year Review 20, 
NERA (2013), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_2012_1113.pdf. 
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between the resolution of a motion for class certification and expected 
settlements.”38 
Summary: Private securities lawsuits play a vital role in enforcing the 
federal securities laws. They deter wrongdoing, compensate investors, and help 
ensure the integrity of the capital markets. The SEC cannot perform the job 
alone. There is bipartisan recognition of the importance of private lawsuits, and 
the Supreme Court should reaffirm the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption. 
 
                                                          
 38 Ronald I. Miller, Dynamic Litigation Analysis: Predicting Securities Class Action Settlements as a Case 
Evolves, NERA (2013), http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Dynamic_Litigation_Analysis_0114.pdf. 
